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National Security, Islamophobia, and Religious Freedom in the U.S.
A central argument in Hurd’s (2015) Beyond Religious Freedom is that the religious
freedom policy framework pursued by the United States not only entrenches lines of
division between religious faiths, but also is constructive of those very divisions.
Where foreign and domestic policies purport to promote tolerance and respectful
pluralism in the name of religious freedom, Hurd (2015, 41) contends they instead
create ‘new forms of social friction defined by religious difference.’ Utilizing Hurd’s
(2015) categories of Official, Governed, and Lived religion I examine Islamophobia
and the racialization of Muslims in the United States and demonstrate how overidentification with religious groups can exacerbate social tensions; how the ‘agenda of
surveillance’ (Hurd 2015) disproportionately targets Muslims in the United States; and
argue that recourse to law and policy alone in response to anti-Muslim discrimination is
unlikely to transform social attitudes towards Muslims. Finally, I utilize a
contemporary reworking of Adam Smith’s sympathetic imagination and radical
democratic theory to propose an alternative pathway towards dissolving the pejorative
ascription of difference to religiously othered individuals.
Keywords: Islam, Muslim, Religious Freedom, United States
Subject classification codes: include these here if the journal requires them

In June 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States partially upheld the ‘Muslim travel
ban’ enacted by President Trump, allowing the Department of Homeland Security to deny
visas to citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries unable to prove an existing
institutional or personal connection in the United States (Laughland 2017). In doing so, the
court has given legal weight to the popular characterisation of Muslims as inherently
dangerous, violent, and unassimilable to American culture. This article examines the
racialization of Muslims in the United States, and the role of social discrimination and state
policies in shaping both the lives of American Muslims, and the racialization process. The
article is structured by, and in conversation with, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd’s (2015) Beyond

Religious Freedom. Hurd’s work is of utility to the discussion of Islamophobia and the
racialization of Muslims in the United States: her critique of religious freedom policies
demonstrates that such policies not only entrench lines of division between religious faiths
but are also constructive of those very divisions; meanwhile, by differentiating between
‘official,’ ‘governed,’ and ‘lived’ religion, Hurd’s schema is able to make sense of the
complex ways in which discourses about ‘Islam’ from multiple sites within government and
society construct how Islam and Muslims are perceived in the United States. Although Hurd
makes mention of the social, political, and historical complexities swirling around and
through any discussion of ‘religion’, she does not herself look outward to the study of race
nor how race intersects with religion. This article is thus a theoretical intervention in and
engagement with Beyond Religious Freedom: drawing on interdisciplinary literature from
sociology, philosophy, and democratic theory I examine how the over-identification with
religious identity exacerbates social tensions for Muslims, who have a long history of
racialization in the United States; how the ‘agenda of surveillance’ (Hurd 2015)
disproportionately targets Muslims in the United States; and argue that recourse to law and
policy in response to anti-Muslim discrimination is, alone, unlikely to transform social
attitudes towards Muslims.
In the first section of this article I take up Hurd’s (2015, 47) claim that ‘when social
tension, discrimination, and violence are reduced to a problem of religious intolerance […]
the complex and multidimensional tapestry of human sociality is lost from sight, and the
multifaceted problems faced by persecuted groups become more difficult to address.’ I argue
that reducing Islamophobia and discrimination against Muslims to simple religious
intolerance fails to account for the racialization of Muslims and the long history of ‘othering’
Islam as an anti-American or anti-Western religion to various ends. In the second section I
turn to the ‘agenda of surveillance’ (Hurd 2015) that has disproportionately dominated the

relationship of the state to Muslims since September 11, 2001. I argue these policies of
regulation and surveillance, enacted in the name of national security, legitimate Islamophobia
in civil-society and further entrench the belief that religious affiliation can be a sufficient
explanation for political behaviour (Hurd 2015, 110). In the final section I turn from analysis
to suggest possible avenues for overcoming the Islamophobia and deep religious, political,
and moral divisions in United States society. Drawing on a contemporary working of Adam
Smith’s sympathetic imagination and theories of radical democracy, I propose a
transformation of the dominant social imagining of Muslim bodies and a turning toward deep
democratic engagements with others across difference.

Lived Religion: Ascriptions of Difference and the Racialization of Muslims

Lived religion, according to Hurd (2015, 8), is ‘religion as practiced by everyday individuals
and groups as they interact with a variety of religious authorities, rituals, texts, and
institutions and seek to navigate and make sense of their lives, connections with others, and
place in the world.’ In Hurd’s schema of official, governed, and lived religion, it is lived
religion that captures the ‘life world’ of religious actors and the various ‘disparate,
improvised forms of religious belonging and practice’ (Hurd 2015, 13). When examining the
experience of ‘living’ Islam in the United States, one is inevitably confronted with the way
Islamophobia and heightened discrimination against Muslims post-2001 circumscribes the
freedom to ‘be Muslim’ in the US. Although freedom of religion is a constitutional guarantee
to all US citizens, the practice of Islam in the US is not as ‘free’ as many Muslims would
like: for example, Islamic holidays may not be recognised by schools or workplaces,
Mosques may be few and far between, and following Islamic dietary law can be difficult in
many places (Peak 2010, 42). Characterising Islamophobia as a form of religious intolerance

obscures that discrimination against Muslims in the United States is a product of both the
hardening of divisions between religious groups (Hurd 2015), and of a long history of
‘othering’ Muslims and Islam as inherently anti-American. This history is inextricably
interwoven with race formation and the construction of Western liberal self-conception. If
religious belonging is ‘disparate’ and ‘improvised’ (Hurd 2015, 13), then the racialization of
Muslims reduces adherents of Islam to a rigid caricature; if religious practice involves
seeking to make sense of one’s place in the world (Hurd 2015, 13), then the negative
ascription of difference and ‘othering’ of American Muslims positions them as ‘out’ of place
in the United States.
Islamophobia is not simply about a ‘fear’ of Islam, and prioritising religious
interpretations of social tensions ‘reduces complex social, historical, and political histories
and inequalities to a problem of religion’ (Hurd 2015, 42). Although Islam is a religion and
not a race, a convincing case has been made that Muslims have undergone ‘racialization’: the
process by which a particular group of people have specific characteristics—usually
negative—inscribed as ‘natural and innate to each member of the group’ (Garner and Selod
2015, 11). The qualities ascribed to Muslims include fundamentalism (Selod 2015, 80;
Shylock 2010, 2), cultural backwardness (Fadda-Conrey 2011, 534; Naber 2006, 243;
Shylock 2010, 2), violence (Naber 2000; Cainkar 2006, 247), cruelty (Naber 2000, 52),
incivility (Fadda-Conrey 2011, 534), and anti-Semitism (Shylock 2010, 2). This racialization
is also gendered, with Muslim men ascribed with misogyny and violence, and Muslim
women with oppression (Al-Faham and Ernst 2016; Naber 2006). Underlying this ascription
of cultural difference in Islamophobia is also a belief about racial hierarchy in the United
States and the relationship of race to American-ness: as Akhtar (2011, 786) argues,
‘becoming an American is strongly linked to whiteness’.

The pejorative ascription of difference to Islam and Muslims in the contemporary
United States did not begin in 2001, but is rather the continuation and intensification of a
much longer racial project. Cultural representations of the Middle East (which is always
conflated with Islam in this social imagining) shifted from the exotic harem and the wealthy
oil sheikh to dangerous terrorist following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, an image only
reinforced by the ‘gun-toting revolutionaries’ of the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979 (Love
2009, 411–12). The pejorative social imagining of Muslims in the US was dominant long
before the events of September 11, 2001: Islamic terrorists were initially blamed for the 1995
bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma, although the perpetrators were actually white
Americans (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009). Cainkar (2006, 247) argues that the
racialization of Arabs/Muslims as essentially different to Americans and inherently violent is
part of a process ‘tied to the United States as a superpower and its foreign (not domestic)
policy interests’. US support of Israel throughout the twentieth century coupled with military
interventions in, or sanctions against, the Muslim-majority states Iran, Iraq, and Syria has
required the manufacture of public consent (Cainkar 2006, 251; Love 2009, 413): and the
civilizational differences ascribed to Arabs and Muslims ‘over there’ as part of this process
results in a simultaneous ascription of difference to Arabs and Muslims ‘over here’ (FaddaConrey 2011, 534).
In addition to justifying US foreign policy and military intervention in the Middle
East and South Asia, the racialization of Muslims and reductive social imagining of Muslim
bodies also serves as the ‘other’ against which an idealised American identity is articulated. If
Islam is intolerant, undemocratic, and violent, then Christian America is tolerant, egalitarian,
and peace-loving. This pejorative ‘othering’ of Islam as inherently anti-American is a
contemporary reminder of Said’s (1978) seminal argument that Muslims have been the
‘other’ against which the entire notion of enlightened liberal Western notions of self are

formed. Much like Said argues, these othering discourses reveal more about American
notions of itself than about any ‘true’ nature of Islam or Muslims. The desire to be (the most)
tolerant, egalitarian, and peaceful requires an opposite against which to be measured. Just as
Hurd (2015, 116) argues that the religious freedom framework encourages people to
recognise and define themselves by religious difference, in the process creating frozen
religious identities that fail to capture the complexity of religious belief and practice, so the
differences racialization posits between Muslim and non-Muslim Americans is constructed
by the process of racialization itself.
The ‘backlash’ (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009) against Muslims in the United States
after the events of September 11, 2001 were thus not simply motivated by the attacks, but
drew on decades-long social prejudice. Anti-Muslim hate crimes spiked sharply after the
events of September 11, 2001 and still have not returned to their pre-2001 levels (Abdelkader
2016). From March 2015 until March 2016 there were ‘approximately 180 reported incidents
of anti-Muslim violence, including: 12 murders; 34 physical assaults; 49 verbal assaults or
threats against persons or institutions; 56 acts of vandalism or destruction of property; 9
arsons; and 8 shootings or bombings’ in the United States (Abdelkader 2016). Hurd’s work is
salient to understanding the positioning of Muslims within US society and their experiences
post-September 11, 2001: she critiques the religious freedom policy framework for
encouraging citizens to recognise religious identities as ‘prior to [any] other identities and
affiliations’ and notes that this ‘heightens the socio-political salience of whatever the national
or international authorities designate as religion’ and constructs ‘an ecology based on
religious difference’ (Hurd 2015, 39). The reification of religious identity is particularly
troubling for Muslim Americans, whose religious beliefs are characterised in much public
discourse as incompatible with American values. When their Muslim identity takes
precedence over any other, their engagements with fellow citizens and with the state is

shaped by this negative ascription of difference. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001,
being recognised as ‘Muslim’ first-and-foremost resulted in violence, harassment, and
discrimination. The extent to which individual Muslims adhere to a particular school of
jurisprudence, to the orthodoxies of an Islamic sect, to ethnic or national cultural norms, to
political ideologies, and their own individual idiosyncrasies is erased by the blanket and
homogenous ‘Muslim identity’.
The case for racialization is particularly convincing as Islamophobia does not only
target Muslims, but also anyone who appears to be Muslim based on a crude set of
assumptions about skin colour, dress, and language bearing little relation to Islam (Al-Faham
and Ernst 2016, 135; Love 2009, 402). For example, the first recorded hate crime after the
World Trade Centre attacks in 2001 was the murder of a Sikh man who was mistaken for a
Muslim because of his turban (Peak 2010, 63). In May 2016, an American Airlines flight
departing from Philadelphia was delayed after a passenger became suspicious of a man with
dark features intently scribbling in a foreign script. The suspect was removed from the flight,
but the man was neither a terrorist, nor a Muslim: he was, rather, an Italian professor of
economics based at the University of Pennsylvania working on a differential equation
(Rampell 2016). This incident demonstrates both the paranoia surrounding Muslims in US
civil society, and the incredibly reductive assumptions made about who Muslims are and
what they look like. Furthermore, just as non-Muslims may experience Islamophobia if they
embody the physical traits assumed to signal ‘Muslim-ness’, Muslims who pass for white
may be free to move through American society unencumbered by Islamophobia (if they are
not easily identified as Muslim by their clothing or name) (Garner and Selod 2015, 12).
One of the key reasons the overly reductive stereotypes of Islam are so widely
accepted is that many Americans simply do not have any contact with Muslims, and most
lack sufficient knowledge about Islam (Peak 2010, 170). Discussing the longevity of

pejorative stereotypes about African-Americans, philosopher of race Churcher (2016, 423)
argues that continuing racial segregation and inequality in the United States means many
White Americans form their understanding of African Americans through ‘dominant social
imaginings of Black bodies’ (like those seen on television) rather than through actual
interactions with African-Americans. Similarly, most non-Muslim Americans are left to form
their understanding of Muslims through dominant social imaginings of Muslims, which are
usually derived from commercial news media and are often pejorative and demeaning (Peak
2010, 168).
The commercial news media fuels the pejorative dominant social imagining of
Muslims and their racialization through a ‘continuous audiovisual resonance of loud voices,
angry faces, mad gestures, and scary portrayals of creeping brown people’ which all work on
an affective level to ‘[shut] down human capacities for paying attention, receptivity, and
curiosity and tarrying with the complexities of people’s lives’ (Coles 2016, 33). In the case of
the World Trade Centre Attacks in 2001, Akhtar (2011, 770) argues that America’s role in
financing the rise of Al-Qaeda and creating the conditions for such attacks to occur through
its foreign policy was ‘invisible’ to the American public thanks to a commercial news media
fixated on ‘sensational news in microbursts of time’ that has no space for ‘comprehensive
historical background’ to any given issue. Without that historical background, the only
explanation left to Americans ‘was that Islam and Muslims had attacked the United States
because of their irrational hatred of democratic values and freedom’ (Akhtar 2011, 770). Here
again, a reductive religious explanation is given for a conflict with complex historical and
political causes (Hurd 2015, 42), perpetuating a social imaginary in which Islam is inherently
opposed to ‘American’ values.
When Muslims do make a personal appearance on commercial news media, the
pejorative dominant social imaginary forecloses their ability to be truly heard by the non-

Muslim audience. In 2013 religious scholar Reza Aslan, an expert in the origins of
Christianity who also happens to be a Muslim convert, was interviewed on Fox News about
his book Zealot: The Life and Times of Jesus of Nazareth. Throughout the interview, Aslan
was assaulted by a barrage of Islamophobic questions and statements from the host,
beginning with her incredulity that a Muslim would write a book about Jesus. The interview
lasts almost nine minutes and shows Aslan repeatedly defending his status as a highlyqualified and respected scholar of religion. The host refuses to accept, despite Aslans
protestations, that there was no Islamic agenda behind the publication (“‘Zealot’ Author Reza
Aslan Responds to Critics” 2013). The host, and no-doubt many viewers, were incapable of
seeing beyond their assumption that Muslims are ‘anti-Christian’ (Shylock 2010, 2), and thus
could not accept Aslan or his work on face value. Here we see evidence of the ‘hard and fast
religious identities’ engendered by the religious freedom framework: Aslan’s identity as a
Muslim trumps his identity (and credentials) as a scholar (Hurd 2015, 42).
The effect of Islamophobia and discrimination against Muslims is a denial of social
citizenship to Muslim Americans (Selod 2015, 78). Prejudice and discrimination cannot
remove the legal rights and protections guaranteed by the constitution and the state, but they
can effectively exile a citizen from the wider society (Cainkar 2006) or effect a form of
cultural exclusion (Fadda-Conrey 2011, 541). As dominant social imaginings of Muslim
Americans consistently highlight their difference from non-Muslim Americans in pejorative
ways, while the religious freedom framework encourages Americans to recognise religious
difference (Hurd 2015)—thus further entrenching lines of division—non-Muslim Americans
are likely to have diminished ‘concern for [Muslim] disadvantage and suffering’ (Churcher
2016, 424). The less we see others as being like ourselves, the less we are able to see them as
people worthy of moral consideration. The problem with pejorative cultural representations
of Muslims is not only the effect it has on non-Muslim attitudes and behaviours towards

Muslims; the pejorative social imaginings impact upon the self-imagining of Muslim
Americans and their ability to enjoy the free use of public space in the United States (AlFaham and Ernst 2016, 144). Charles Taylor (1994, 25) argues, ‘a person or group of people
suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a
confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.’
The distortion to Muslim American self-imagining translates into a different, more
constrained mode of being in public space that largely impacts those from working-class
backgrounds (Naber 2006) or women (Al-Faham and Ernst 2016; Naber 2006). Naber’s
(2006, 245) research with American Muslims post September 11, 2001 demonstrates how
those from working class backgrounds tended to experience Islamophobia in more ‘violent
and life threatening’ ways than Muslims from middle and upper class backgrounds. Working
class Muslims are more likely to take public transport, or walk, and were thus more
frequently in public spaces and more vulnerable to violence than middle and upper-class
Muslims. The visibility of Muslim women who veil also exacerbates the likelihood of their
being the target of Islamophobia, and women may be encouraged by their families to stay off
the streets or at home to avoid harassment and attack (Naber 2006). This behaviour is what
Du Bois calls ‘double-conscioussness’ where ‘minority groups learn to read themselves
through the eyes and mindsets of the majority population, and regulate their behaviour
accordingly in specific contexts […] to manage the risks of discrimination, confrontation, and
abuse’ (Garner and Selod 2015, 17). In some cases, this meant refraining from speaking
Arabic in public (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009, 169), while some women chose to remove
their headscarves in certain places to avoid harassment (Naber 2006). In attempting to
circumvent the repercussions of the pejorative social imaginings of Muslim bodies, some
Muslim Americans ‘cast off their religious identity’ (Peak 2010, 42) and, in the process,
concede that ‘Islam’ has no place in the American public sphere.

Governed Religion: The ‘Agenda of Surveillance’ and Islamophobia
Where the section above examined the experience of living as a Muslim in the United States,
this section focuses upon the relationship of the state to Muslim-Americans. Hurd (2015, 8)
labels this governed religion, ‘religion as constructed by those in positions of political and
religious power. In today’s world, this includes states, often through the law, but also other
authorities.’ I argue that one cannot separate the denial of ‘social citizenship’ to Muslim
Americans (Selod 2015, 78) from the foreign and domestic policies pursued by the United
States following 9/11. Prejudice and discrimination, such as the Islamophobia discussed
above, can be given legitimation and thus flourish if the state does not take an active stand
against it. Should the state appear to support such discrimination, it only further solidifies
these attitudes and behaviours amongst citizens (Smith 2015, 16). In the United States,
government authorities and agencies at federal, state, and local levels have since 9/11 enacted
a number of laws and programs that single out Muslims as a group worthy of suspicion. Hurd
(2015, 8) argues that under the ‘religious freedom’ doctrine, religion is understood by states
in a ‘two faces of faith’ model; whereby ‘good’ religion is celebrated ‘as a source of morality
and cohesion’ and ‘bad’ religion is subjected to the ‘agenda of surveillance, which fears
religion as a potential danger to be contained and suppressed.’
I argue that, by and large, Islam has come under the ‘agenda of surveillance’ (Hurd
2015) in the United States since 2001—simply being a Muslim is reason enough to be
suspected of supporting terrorism or violence. Islam as constructed by governing authorities
in the United States, just like the Islam constructed in the dominant social imaginary, is
inherently violent, anti-democratic, and anti-American. Where the pejorative dominant social
imagining of Muslims has a long history, the governance of Islam as a ‘bad’ religion subject
to surveillance and management occurred in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. In the
weeks and months following the attacks on the World Trade Centre, the US government

enacted numerous policies many of which specifically targeted Arab and Muslim
communities. For example, The US PATRIOT Act (October 21 2001) gave sweeping powers
to law enforcement agencies to search, monitor, and detain suspects, and widened the scope
of terrorism-related crimes to include financial or material support for ‘questionable nonprofits’ (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009, 165); the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(November 2001) established the TSA and gave it power to use intelligence from numerous
government agencies to screen passenger lists and prevent individuals identified as a ‘threat’
from boarding aircraft (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009, 255); and the National Security
Entry-Exit Registration System (June 2002) compels ‘aliens from designated countries to “(I)
register, submit to fingerprints and photographs upon their arrival in the United States; (2)
report to INS field offices within 30 days, and then re-report annually, and (3) notify an INS
agent of their departure, with possible criminal prosecution for those who fail to comply”’
(Chishti et al. 2003 in Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009, 257).
Policies such as these legitimated widespread public backlash against American
Muslims (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009, 2) including the loss of jobs (Bakalian and
Bozorgmehr 2009, 147), street harassment (Al-Faham and Ernst 2016), and violence
(Abdelkader 2016). Indeed, interviews with Muslim leaders revealed they believed the
government policies were ‘more harmful to the overall well-being of their communities than
the incidents of harassment and hate crimes by ordinary citizens’ (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr
2009, 156). In one example of a program specifically constructing Muslims as inherently
suspicious and anti-American, the New York Police Department (NYPD) ran a program of
mass surveillance against Muslims—including individuals, community centres, and
Mosques—living under their jurisdiction. In documents filed as part of a lawsuit against the
NYPD on behalf of New York Muslims in 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) documented the extent of the program and argued the program ‘operated under the

unconstitutional premise that Muslim beliefs and practices are a basis for law enforcement
scrutiny’ (ACLU 2013). The NYPD program employed undercover agents to infiltrate
Mosques and Islamic institutions; monitored websites, blogs, and online forums; and
recorded the Friday sermons of Islamic leaders. All the gathered information was stored in an
intelligence database operated by the NYPD. The ACLU notes, ‘a police representative has
admitted that the mapping activities did not generate a single lead or resulted in even one
terrorism investigation’ (ACLU 2013).
Securitization—the increase of state surveillance including the storage of private data,
increased police powers, and stricter border controls—is occurring across the Western world
(see Chebel d’Appollonia 2012). But there appears to be a reasonable case that in the United
States the security state is disproportionately targeting Muslims: being Muslim or a citizen of
a Muslim-majority nation is seen by the security state as evidence for supporting terrorism
(Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009, 156). Hurd (2015, 116) argues that under the religious
freedom policy framework, religion is seen as a sufficient explanation for political behaviour.
Such an assumption reinforces the normative value of a Christian, liberal, private religious
practice: ‘Could it be that a person who takes his or her religion literally is a potential
terrorist? That only someone who thinks of a religious text as not literal, but as metaphorical
or figurative, is better suited to civic life and the tolerance it calls for?’ (Mamdani 2002, 767).
The profiling of Muslims has been largely inaccurate: being Muslim does not necessarily
entail the support of or engagement in terrorism. The continuation of heightened ‘national
security’ measures—the Muslim immigration ban mentioned in the introduction is the most
recent example—suggests other motives and causes to the surveillance and targeting of
Muslims not captured by recourse to a religious explanation.
The domestic policies of the United States towards Muslims are intimately related to
the foreign policies it pursues with Middle Eastern and Muslim-majority countries. The War

on Terror, begun after September 11, 2001 in the pursuit of Al-Qaeda, identified its target as
the amorphous and shifting enemy ‘terrorism’ rather than any particular state or regime.
Terrorism in this war was conceived narrowly as acts of violence planned and carried out by
Muslim agents. As a result, ‘a myriad of ethnicities and nationalities [were] classified into a
monolithic category of Muslim’ and became immediately suspect (Selod 2015, 80). Naber
(2006, 424) writes that throughout American history, ‘during moments of national crisis or
war, immigrant exclusion has tended to intensify, particularly for immigrants from the
countries the US is invading.’ Indeed, many scholars examining the implementation of
policies targeting the Muslim population post-2001 have looked to the internment of
Japanese Americans during World War II as a comparative case (Al-Faham and Ernst 2016;
Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009; Cainkar 2006; Fadda-Conrey 2011; Naber 2006). Although
Muslims have not been placed in internment camps, some argue that the detention and
deportation of thousands of Arab and Muslim men, and compulsory registration of tens of
thousands more post-September 11, 2001, is ‘internment, happening at a slow pace (Naber
2006, 258). The implementation of such domestic policies are the ‘institutional’ contribution
to the racialization of Muslims in the US, as racialization always occurs in an historical and
cultural context under particular power relationships and results in discrimination ranging
from ‘denial of access to resources at one end [of the spectrum] to genocide at the other’
(Garner and Selod 2015, 11).
Islam within the US is governed through the ‘agenda of surveillance’ and constructed
as a religion to fear and suspect – this is matched by a foreign policy that seeks to remake
Islam in the image of American cultural values. Hurd (2015, 25) notes that the invasion of
Afghanistan in late 2001 was partially justified to the US public as an effort to reform the
violent and misogynistic cultural and religious practices of the Muslim-majority nation. In
this discourse, the US positioned religion as ‘both the problem and the solution. The United

States sought to liberate Afghan women by transforming them into correctly religious
(tolerant, free, Muslim or post-Muslim) women’ (Hurd 2015, 25). What is considered
‘correctly’ religious is determined by standards using American culture (white, Christian,
liberal) as the yardstick and include women not veiling, being active in public spaces, and
being willing consumers of goods and culture (Hurd 2015, 25). Adherence to these standards,
or to the ‘correctly’ religious ideal of United States foreign policy, requires an effective
rejection of publicly visible markers of Islamic piety. In the section above, I demonstrated
how the racialization of Muslim bodies similarly constructs a monolithic category of
‘Muslim’ and pressures Muslim Americans to ‘pass’ as Americans. US foreign policy,
through different means, also attempts to reform ‘bad’ Islam into a ‘good’ religion – defined
through adherence to American cultural (Christian) norms (Hurd 2015).
All these policies—domestic and foreign—underscore the perception of Islam as
inherently un-American, whether through assuming belief in Islam is sufficient grounds for
suspecting support of terrorism, or through assuming Islam is a ‘bad’ religion that must be
reformed. When a state enacts policies such as these against a minority group like Muslims,
they legitimate any discrimination already occurring within civil society and potentially
encourage more (Smith 2015, 31). As I discussed in the previous section, Islam in the United
States already has a long history of being perceived with suspicion prior to September 11,
2001 and the implementation of the policies discussed here. The dominant social imaginings
of Muslim bodies are already largely pejorative and fearful. These policies, therefore, only
exacerbate the prejudice towards Muslims in the United States, and the denial of their social
citizenship. In the section above I showed how ‘double-consciousness’ causes Muslims to
buy into the pejorative dominant social imaginary and alter their behaviour to avoid
harassment and violence. This ‘double-consciousness’ is compounded by the domestic
policies pursued by the United States: for example, Imams at New York City mosques

affected by the NYPD surveillance program reported anguishing over their sermons lest they
be recorded and words taken out of context or misrepresented. They also noted an overall
drop in mosque attendance, with their congregations become more closed and suspicious of
outsiders and new-comers due to anxiety over NYPD informants and undercover agents
(ACLU 2013).
Most discussion of ‘fear’ in the United States positions ‘the nation’ as afraid, and
Muslims or Islam as the object of fear (Naber 2006, 257). Yet Muslim Americans report
feeling constrained, anxious, and afraid under the ‘agenda of surveillance’ imposed by the US
government post-September 11, 2001, and results in what Naber (2006, 254) calls ‘the
internment of the psyche’ where the ‘culture of fear produced a sense of internal
incarceration that was emotive and manifested in terms of the sense that, at any moment, one
may be picked up, locked, up, or disappeared’. To the extent that Muslim Americans identify
with the United States and as ‘American’, they too came under attack on September 11, 2001,
and reported emotions like shock, disbelief, confusion, anger and fear in the immediate
aftermath (Peak 2010, 106–7). Yet the US government (and often their neighbours) treated
them as suspects and not victims (Sirin and Fine 2007, 151). In a similar vein to Naber, Peak
(2010, 113) argues that Muslim Americans suffered from ‘compounded fear’ in the weeks
and months following September 11, 2001: in addition to the ‘terror-induced fears’
experienced by many Americans like fear of public spaces and events, flying, and future
terrorists attacks, they were also afraid of such things as religious profiling, hate crimes, and
mass internment (Peak 2010, 114).
Much like harassment and discrimination in the social world, the impact of governing
Islam as a religion to be feared falls along gendered lines, with Muslim men more frequently
the target of government policies (Al-Faham and Ernst 2016, 133). The ‘governing’ of Islam
by the United States ultimately reinforces the racialization of Muslims: domestic and foreign

policies that treat adherence to Islam as grounds for suspicion give legitimacy to a social
imaginary that casts Muslims as inherently anti-democratic and anti-American; and the
surveillance, detention, and deportation of thousands of Muslim American men deemed to be
a potential ‘threat’ to the nation reinscribe violence as an inherent characteristic of Islamic
masculinity.

Looking Beyond Religious Freedom: A Grassroots-Focused Response
Hurd concludes Beyond Religious Freedom by advocating for a de-centring (of sorts) of
religion in policy: religion, she argues, is not a stable category and thus any attempt at
producing policy to govern ‘religion’ reifies only one, partial and imperfect, ‘religion’ (Hurd
2015, 112, 120–24). This approach is at odds with the response of many American Muslims
to their harassment and discriminatory government policies. Muslim Americans have
mobilized in substantial numbers in post-September 11, 2001 America as Muslims (Bakalian
and Bozorgmehr 2009). One of the most common responses to perceived discrimination on
the basis of religion is through legal channels – a direct petitioning of the state. For example,
when Abercrombie and Fitch denied a Muslim girl wearing hijab a job, she took the company
to court and won (Kasperkevic 2016), as did a schoolgirl denied the same right at her school
(ACLU 2008). Recourse to the law is a familiar, well-understood strategy and thus it is not
surprising it is often the first solution to such issues. Cainkar (2006, 248) argues Arab and
Middle Eastern Americans have a better claim on the state as Muslims than as a racial group,
just as Hurd (2015, 111) posits that the religious freedom policy framework ‘presupposes
discrete religious identities as the foundation of the social order.’ However, I suggest that the
law is not an effective strategy by itself for effecting long-term change at the social level.
Hurd (2015, 124) agrees, quoting Berger in arguing that ‘excessive privileging of law and
legal speech … can “efface the affective and relational dimensions of our social worlds.”’

One may win a legal battle and may even be able to enforce the outcome of that victory, but
the underlying social attitudes and dominant social imaginary is not challenged by such
victories, and social tensions may be exacerbated by such an approach.
I suggest that genuine change for Muslim Americans requires a change in social
attitudes, and a challenge to the pejorative dominant social imagining of Muslim bodies. I do
not deny that federal or state policies or initiatives that disproportionately target Muslims and
take adherence to Islam as reasonable grounds for suspicion, policing, and control must be
challenged. However, in this article, my interest in these policies is the ways in which they
legitimate social discrimination and reinscribe racialized understandings of Muslim bodies.
Thus in this section, I begin a proscriptive project grounded not in law, or foreign policy, but
in the daily lives of citizens. I argue that, although changing the way religious diversity is
understood and engaged with at the level of foreign and domestic policy is important,
changes at this level do not easily or necessarily ‘trickle down’ to the level of lived religion. I
would like to see a change in the way fellow-citizens relate to one another across difference.
Overcoming Islamophobia, and other sectarian prejudices, requires both top down initiatives
and a grassroots movement.
I am under no illusions that changing social attitudes and relationships is easy. Social
change is a long, slow, hard-fought process requiring multiple tactics, some of which
inevitably fail. In what follows I engage with the ideas of a social philosopher and a radical
democratic theorist who both, in their own ways, attempt to find a way to bring people
together across lines of difference. Neither of their approaches are perfect, but both could be
applicable for overcoming sectarian boundaries and the over-identification with religion in
civil society. Hurd (2015, 116) argues, in creating stable categories and definitions of
religious identity, the religious freedom framework fails to capture ‘the complexities and
contingencies of human behaviour’, and the theories I engage with here both emphasise the

necessity of moving from an understanding of others based on shallow stereotypes and
category definitions to a deep understanding grounded in the recognition that all humans are
complex beings. Most importantly, both are hopeful in their belief in the ability of humans to
act morally and see humanity in all people, no matter how different.
The dominant social imagining of Muslims in the United States is formed by a
commercial media of ‘pulsating fury’ that is more ‘audiovisual performance’ than genuine
journalism (Coles 2016, 33), matched by a politics of fear emanating from the highest offices
and given legitimacy by a raft of federal and state national security measures
disproportionately targeting Muslims. Challenging these pejorative narratives requires
finding a way to present a nuanced and complex portrayal of Muslims lives, including their
experiences of discrimination, that emphasises their shared humanity over and above any
religious (or other) difference. Just as Hurd (2015) wishes to ‘de-centre’ religion in policy
discourse, so I wish to ‘de-centre’ the salience of religious identity in the social world
without discounting the significance of religious identity to religious subjects. Recent work in
the philosophy of race may be useful in this context. Social philosopher Churcher (2016, 421)
uses Adam Smith’s concept of the sympathetic imagination to argue privileged racial groups
could “imagine” themselves into the bodies (and experiences) of marginalized and devalued
racial groups to transform how they relate to others.i The goal of such an imaginative exercise
is to have “fellow-feeling” with the other to better understand their social position and
recognise common humanity. The same logic can be applied to non-Muslim imaginings of
Muslims. Of course, our ability to have ‘fellow-feeling’ with others relies on the recognition
of commonality, of seeing others as being like ourselves (Churcher 2016, 424). This fellowfeeling is best developed through rich interpersonal relationships, whether romantic, as
friends, or through transracial familial bonds.

The key problem with such an approach is that many Americans can quite easily
never have contact with Muslims, let alone form rich relationships with them (Peak 2010).
The sympathetic imagination is ineffective if we do not have the knowledge or understanding
of the other to flesh out our imagined embodiment (Churcher 2016, 429). The solution
Churcher offers is to use literature as a stand-in for relationships and a doorway into the
world of the racialized other. She details a number of literary works that invite readers to
enter imaginatively into the experiences of racially different others, compelling ‘readers to
recognise Black disadvantage, vulnerability and resilience in a way that engages their
emotions’ (Churcher 2016, 433). There are a wealth of texts written by Muslim and Arab
Americans that ‘respond to the post-9/11 political and social terrain in the US capturing and
challenging homogenized depictions of Arab Americans’ and opening up new possibilities
for a more inclusive conception of US citizenship and American identity (Fadda-Conrey
2011, 533).
I agree with Churcher that literature can evoke within us sympathy for fictional
characters that will have ‘ethically transformative effects’ on how we relate to differently
racialized others (Churcher 2016, 434). However, I have my reservations about the
effectiveness of relying on literature alone to reach Americans with no close contact with
Muslims. I doubt that Americans who already buy into the dominant social imaginary would
voluntarily read a novel or piece of writing, written by a Muslim, and containing a nuanced
and complex portrayal of Muslim life in America. I argue such transformation in the
dominant social imaginary is more likely to occur through the representation of Muslims on
television and film in the US. Indeed, other minority groups have already successfully shifted
pejorative public attitudes through positive representations in the media (Loftus 2001).
However, this is not simply a matter of increasing the number of Muslim characters, or news
anchors, regularly appearing on American screens: the type of representation is significant.

Alsultany (2012, 146) argues that even positive representations of Muslims can have negative
effects: television shows that continually ‘advertise’ the loyalty and patriotism of Muslim
Americans manages to reinforce that this patriotism and loyalty is newsworthy or
exceptional. Despite the good intentions of creators, many end up ‘promoting limited and
acceptable versions of diversity’ (Alsultany 2012, 146).
Challenging the dominant social imaginary through more nuanced representations of
Muslims on television is one possible tactic in creating social change. The second tactic I
wish to explore is real-life engagement with diverse others through rich, deep democratic
practices. Such engagements may promote the formation of real-life relationships that prompt
people to challenge any stereotypes or shallow categorisations they make about religiouslydifferent others. Hurd (2015, 112-3) argues that ‘to make religion the point from which social
relations are enacted and institutional policy is developed contributes to the production of
politicized religious difference.’ Yet, in problematizing the religious freedom policy
framework she does not address how ‘social relations’ should be enacted. I find Romand
Coles (2016) work on radical and ecological democracy particularly inspiring at this juncture.
Although his work is directed primary at developing a new form of politics to resist the
hegemony of neoliberal capitalism and counteract the strangulation of genuine democracy he
diagnoses as a result of this hegemony, it has utility in putting forward an argument for
radically democratic social relationships.
Coles (2016) recognises that much of the power of the ‘evangelical capitalist
resonance machine’, and the commercial media which acts as its ‘echo chamber’ (Connolly
2005, 870) is their ability to act on the affective level, pulling at us from below the level of
cognition. Resistance and transformative movements can also, however, work at the affective
level to counteract the pull of fear and hatred. Coles (2016) writes of community organizing
in Arizona: legal and undocumented migrants, local residents, social workers, and students

coming together with local law enforcement to communicate their experiences of the policing
of illegal migration and its detrimental effects upon their communities; or of a community
garden at Northern Arizona University that brings together students, faculty, and community
members alike over the shared project of growing and eating. These interactions are
significant because of the way they changed people: ‘faces were lighting up; faces and bodies
were manifesting signs of democratic receptivity with each other—leaning forward, twisting,
turning, tilting, in ways that seemed to manifest energies of opening’ (Coles 2016, 34). These
physical and affective responses to other human beings, often across racial, religious, and
political difference, engender a willingness to be open to others (Coles 2016).
Muslim environmentalists in the US have reported how their involvement in
environmental coalitions and groups help challenge pejorative assumptions about Islam held
by non-Muslim activists (Hancock 2017). In working on a common ‘neutral’ goal like
environmentalism, people from diverse religious, racial, and socio-economic backgrounds are
able to find commonality. These experiences demonstrate the ability of the sympathetic
imagination to overcome difference when it is grounded in actual experience and knowledge
of the ‘other’ (Churcher 2016). Thus, initiatives and policies that bring people together across
multiple lines of difference are likely to begin to challenge the pejorative dominant social
imagining of Muslim bodies on a person-to-person level. As mentioned above, the clear limit
to this approach is the size of the Muslim population in the US: should all Americans decide
suddenly to become active in community organizing or neighbourhood groups (which is
highly unlikely), many would still not come across Muslims and therefore not have their
assumptions challenged.
However, if Coles (2016, 32–33) is correct that repeated exposure to commercial
news media can shut down our ‘capacities for paying attention, receptivity, and curiosity and
tarrying with the complexities of people’s lives’, then surely, hopefully, repeated exposure to

democratic practices and engagements of any kind can open up such possibilities. Once the
first leap across difference is made, be it with another of a different race, or political
persuasion, or sexual orientation, and we are able to imaginatively enter into the complexities
of life of someone different to us and see how dominant social imaginings misrepresents and
harms this other, can we not make the rational leap that the dominant social imagination may
misrepresent those (Muslim) others who are different yet again. If Americans, as many as
possible, commit to engaging deeply, slowly, and democratically with others, any others who
are different to themselves, then those interactions may form habits and practices that allow
them to transform how they understand and relate to Muslims (and any other denigrated
minority, for that matter).

Conclusion
The religious freedom policy framework has arguably fed into pre-existing prejudices and
social imaginings to further entrench discrimination and the pejorative ascription of
difference to Muslim Americans. Muslim bodies have been racialized through the
commercial news media and populist politicians, and are imagined as inherently violent,
misogynist, and anti-American. As a result, Muslim Americans are denied social citizenship
by some of their fellow-citizens and are treated with suspicion by state institutions. To fall
back upon policy and legal interventions to enforce just treatment and make claims is, I
argue, falling far short of what is required. Real change requires a transformation of the
dominant social imagining of Muslim bodies and the formation of rich democratic
relationships across lines of difference. These efforts must be pursued as part of a larger
multi-tactic strategy that encompasses policy, legal, and social change in how American
society understands and engages with diverse religious communities.
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i

Smith argues our ability to relate to others and behave ethically is grounded in ‘sympathy’ – which
he defines as imaginatively entering into the body and experiences of another person. It is in
exercising our ‘sympathetic imagination’ that we are bound together in a moral community
where we see others as being like ourselves and thus worthy of our concern (Churcher 2016).

